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In recent years, consciousness has become a central topic in cognitive neuroscience. This review focuses on
the relation between bodily self-consciousness – the feeling of being a subject in a body – and visual
consciousness – the subjective experience associated with the perception of visual signals.
Recent findings
Findings from clinical and experimental work have shown that bodily self-consciousness depends on
specific brain networks and is related to the integration of signals from multiple sensory modalities
including vision. In addition, recent experiments have shown that visual consciousness is shaped by the
body, including vestibular, tactile, proprioceptive, and motor signals.
Summary
Several lines of evidence suggest reciprocal relationships between vision and bodily signals, indicating that
a comprehensive understanding of visual and bodily self-consciousness requires studying them in unison.
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Brain activity causes subjective experience. It ‘feels
like something’ to see a rose, and this feeling is
qualitatively different from touching or smelling
it and seeing an orchid [2]. For the past 20 years,
there have been considerable efforts to describe the
so-called ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (NCC),
which is the minimal set of neuronal events and
mechanisms sufficient for a specific conscious per-
cept [3]. The NCC have traditionally been sketched
using a contrastive approach, whereby neural and
cognitive responses elicited by perceived vs. unper-
ceived stimuli are compared [4]. Theories that
emerged from this approach state that conscious-
ness requires, for example, information integration
throughout the brain, involving mechanisms such
as short-range [5] or long-range [6] feedback con-
nections, or neural synchrony [7]. Most data and
greatest detail regarding the neural correlates of
perceptual consciousness arguably comes from vis-
ual psychophysics and brain imaging, where an
arsenal of techniques allows the display of sublim-
inal, invisible images in various manners [8
&
,9].
Although these studies led to a better understanding
of visual consciousness, the interaction of conscious
and unconscious visionwith other senses remains to
be explored, which is crucial considering themulti-
sensory nature of perception [10
&
]. One can note
that the sense of touch constitutes a promising Kluwer Health, Inc. Una
Health | Lippincott Williams & Wilkmodel to study perceptual consciousness, consider-
ing its rather ‘primitive’ attributes, with both phylo-
genetic and ontogenetic roots preceding those of
vision [1]. Accordingly, its functional organization
and the computational steps underlying tactile con-
sciousness are likely tobe simpler compared tovision,
and therefore more accessible to empirical investi-
gations and theoretical interpretations.
Moreover, subjective aspects of perceptual con-
sciousness (or qualia) have remained elusive in
models of visual consciousness or continue to be
associated with most disagreement among con-
sciousness researchers and philosophers (for a
recent example, see [11] and the related commen-
tary [12]). Notably, there is no consensus as to
whether a theory of visual consciousness should
explain how phenomenal experience arises from
physical events in the brain (the hard problem oruthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
ins www.co-neurology.com
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KEY POINTS
 BSC stems from the integration of visual, tactile,
proprioceptive, and vestibular signals.
 Visual perception reflects the product of integration with
other sensory signals, including bodily signals.
 Multisensory integration occurs unconsciously, prior to
conscious access, potentially resulting in
phenomenal unity.
Neuro-ophthalmology and neuro-otologyphenomenal consciousness) or rather characterize
the mechanisms supporting cognitive access to
consciousness (the easy problem or access con-
sciousness) [13,14].
Furthermore, the observer who is the subject of
conscious experience is generally not accounted for
by these models of visual consciousness. Yet, a
fundamental property of consciousness is its link
with the self: the subject of conscious experience.
The ‘rose’ that is seen, felt, or smelled is bounded to
the ‘I’ of subjective experience, is felt by somebody,
the self or subject of experience. This sense of self
and its close link to neural body representation has
been termed bodily self-consciousness (BSC) and has
been a target of recent research [15]. BSC is com-
monly thought to involve self-identification (the
experience of owning ‘my’ body), self-location
(the experience of where ‘I’ am in space), and
first-person perspective (the experience from where
‘I’ perceive the world) [16]. The scientific study of
BSC has expanded over the last years, benefiting
from the examination of neurological patients with
altered states of BSC and virtual reality coupled with
robotics to induce well controlled states in the
research laboratory. For instance, altered states of
BSC of neurological origin may be experienced from
a location and perspective that are not centered on
the physical body of the observer, but are never-
theless characterized by an experience of the visual
world that is complete, differentiated, and inte-
grated. In these so-called out-of-body experiences,
the subject or center of consciousness is experienced
as being displaced to an elevated and down-looking
first-person perspective and location [17]. The ‘rose’
on a table in the field of view of the observer would
thus still be perceived consciously during an out-of-
body experience, but seen from a distanced and
elevated location and first-person perspective (see
below for recent studies in healthy subjects on BSC).
Do visual consciousness and BSC relate to each
other? Ithasbeenargued that (visual)perception isby
essence embodied within an egocentric, body-cen-
tered framework ([18,19]; but see [20] for a critical
discussion about embodiment and consciousness).yright © 2015 Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. Unaut
2 www.co-neurology.comMuch less is known about whether and how bodily
processing impacts visual consciousness and how
visual processing relates to BSC, as each aspect of
consciousness has mostly been studied in relative
separation. However, consciousness at the
phenomenal level is an integrated and unitary
experience: integrated as multiple sensory streams
are seamlessly joined, and unitary as conscious-
ness is experienced by a singular self [21]. Inter-
estingly, integrated visual consciousness may
break down in neurological patients with simul-
tagnosia reporting the inability to perceive more
than one object at once [22], while unitary con-
sciousness may break down in neurological
patients with heautoscopy reporting two simul-
taneous, but distinct, centers of consciousness
[23
&
]. Here, we review empirical results document-
ing the interplay between visual consciousness
and BSC, pointing toward the importance of their
combined investigation for a fuller understanding
of consciousness.INFLUENCES OF VISION ON BODILY SELF-
CONSCIOUSNESS
There is now compelling evidence that BSC involves
the cortical integration of different signals from the
external environment (exteroception: visual, audi-
tory, and tactile senses, see [24] for a review) and the
body (vestibular and proprioceptive senses; intero-
ceptive cardiac and respiratory signals, see [25]).
Data from neurological patients with altered states
of BSC were associated with deficits in multisensory
integration and involved the right temporoparietal
cortex with abnormal self-location and first-person
perspective, but unitary consciousness [26], and the
left insula with abnormal self-location, first-person
perspective, and the loss of unitary consciousness
[23
&
]. Recent experimental paradigms in healthy
participants employed multisensory conflicts,
reporting modulations of the three aforementioned
main aspects of BSC. For example, in the well known
rubber-hand illusion, participants viewing an artifi-
cial hand being stroked in synchronywith their own
occluded hand (placed at a different position)
experience that the artificial hand belongs to their
own body, and perceive their hand as shifted toward
the artificial hand’s position [27]. This illusion is
thought to stem from visual capture of the multi-
sensory conflict between visual, proprioceptive, and
tactile stimuli that are temporally synchronous (vis-
ual, tactile) but spatially incongruent (visual, pro-
prioceptive): what is seen (an artificial hand being
stroked) does not match with what is felt (one’s
hand being stroked). With temporal delay between
the visual and tactile stimulation, the illusion andhorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
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[28]). In recent years, the development of video,
virtual reality, and robotic devices have allowed
researchers to extend the study of limb ownership
to full-body ownership and other aspects of BSC
[15]. In the so-called full-body (or ‘out-of-body’)
illusion (FBI), multisensory conflicts modulate
not only limb ownership but also ownership/self-
identification as well as self-location for the full
body, mimicking neurological conditions such as
out-of-body experiences, heautoscopy, and related
altered states of BSC [29,30]. Typically, participants
view their filmed own body (a ‘virtual body’) from a
posterior third-person perspective while perceiving
repeated tactile stimulations on their back or chest.
As in the rubber-hand illusion, conflicting multi-
sensory stimulation exists between what is seen
(the avatar being stroked) and what is felt (the
participant’s back being stroked). Compared to
asynchronous visuotactile stroking, participants
in synchronous visuotactile stroking self-identify
more with the seen virtual body, judge their pos-
itions as closer to it, and mislocalize the tactile
stimulus to the virtual body. Additional studies
have shown autonomic bodily responses, such as
skin cooling stemming from such bodily illusions
[31,32
&
]. Brain imaging studies using the FBI have
revealed that the premotor cortex, intraparietal
sulcus, and extrastriate visual regions are involved
in the sense of body ownership, whereas the tem-
poroparietal cortex and insula are involved in the
sense of self-location and first-person perspective
[26,33
&
,34].
These results support the idea that BSC stems
from the integration of visual, tactile, propriocep-
tive [35], and vestibular [36] signals. Both in the
rubber-hand and the FBIs, subjective changes in
BSC are held to arise from a resolution of multi-
sensory conflicts bymeans ofminimization of error
signals [37
&&
,38
&&
]. Visual dominance is prevalent in
that respect, as it dominates proprioceptive inputs
[39] when the apparent seen location of a body part
does not match its actual location. Such visual
modulation of bodily signals is also reflected in
the tactile domain, as seeing one’s hand improves
tactile acuity on the hand, compared to seeing a
nonhand object (visual enhancement of touch
[40]). This latter effect is further boosted by hand
ownership manipulations [41], as revealed by the
crossmodal congruency effect for hands [42] and
avatars [43]. Taken together, these results highlight
the role of visual signals in experimentally and
neurologically induced altered states of BSC. In
the next section, we evaluate the complementary
idea by assessing whether vision is affected by
bodily signals.opyright © 2015 Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. Una
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VISION
On a continuous basis, coalitions of interoceptive
and exteroceptive sensors convey information about
various aspects of the body and the environment.
Despite this tremendous amount of information,
percepts are not experienced as sums of independent
features, but as integrated multimodal scenes [21].
That is, colors, smells, and textures are all experi-
encedas integrated intoacommonperceptualobject.
The same holds for bodily experience, as subjects
typically experience themselves as a unified whole
(but see heautoscopy; [16,23
&
]). As argued above,
consciousness is a unified and essentially multisen-
sory experience, rather than a sum of unimodal
features [10
&
]. Multisensory integration – the func-
tion whereby information from different sensory
modalities is combined together – is thus central
to both visual consciousness and BSC. Building upon
the notion of phenomenal unity (i.e., the perception
of multiple sensory streams as a multimodal), most
theories of visual consciousness postulate strong
interdependencies betweenmultisensory integration
and consciousness (see [44
&&
] for a review). Yet, these
interdependencies are unlikely to imply necessity, as
sensory signals from different modalities are inte-
grated at early stages or processing already in sub-
cortical structures, arguably unconsciously [45]. In
addition, there is also compelling evidence for
unconscious multisensory integration of more com-
plex stimuli, as theperceptionof invisible images can
be modulated by the simultaneous presence of
another supraliminal stimulus presented in the audi-
tory [46
&
,47
&
], tactile [48,49
&
], or proprioceptive
modalities [50
&
]. Beyond the integration of a supra-
liminal and a subliminal stimulus, a recent study
showed that an invisible stimulus can also be inte-
grated with an inaudible one (up to semantic levels),
therefore arguing for high-level multisensory integ-
ration in the complete absence of perceptual con-
sciousness [51
&
]. Taken together, these results suggest
that multisensory integration that is of relevance
for visual consciousness and BSC most likely is an
automatic brain process, governed by bottom-up
mechanisms that precede conscious access.
If perceptionandvisual consciousness are embod-
ied, changes in visual consciousness depending on
bodily signals are expected. Yet, the mere idea of all-
or-none modulations of visual perception depending
on BSC seems hardly testable empirically, as bodily
signals of interoceptive, vestibular, or proprioceptive
origin are never completely disrupted, even in the
most severe neurological conditions (e.g., locked-in
syndrome, deafferentation, and tetraplegia) or exper-
imental manipulations (e.g., sensory deprivation).uthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
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Neuro-ophthalmology and neuro-otologyHowever, several studies have investigated directly
the impact of bodily signals on thresholds for visual
consciousness. One focused on proprioception and
showed that images of hands emerged faster into
visual consciousness when their orientation was con-
gruent with the actual position of the participants’
hands when seeing the display (palm up vs. palm
down) [50
&
]. This suggests that proprioceptive signals
can modulate the threshold for visual consciousness
for an object in a quantitativemanner. Another study
applied a similar experimental logic to touch–vision
interactions showing facilitatory effects of congruent
tactile stimuli on visual consciousness [52
&
]. More
recently, it was also shown that neural events locked
to heartbeats correlated with the detection of a faint
visual grating, revealing the impact of interoceptive
bodily cues (cardiac signal) on visual consciousness
[53
&
] as also revealed for BSC [25,54
&
]. Taken together
these studies suggest that visual consciousness is
facilitated when visual signals are congruent with
bodily signals at the spatial or temporal level, and
inhibited in the presence of multimodal conflicts.
Further studies are required to investigate these effects
and the possible influences of other sensory modal-
ities suchasvestibular signalsonvisualconsciousness,
and the involved neural mechanism responsible for
such multisensory effects.
Beyond the threshold for visual consciousness,
there is long-standing compelling evidence that
bodily signals can alter the content of visual per-
ception. Indeed, numerous studies reported
changes in visual percepts depending on vestibular
inputs (e.g., oculogravic illusion [55,56]; bistable
perception [57
&
]), proprioceptive inputs (e.g., Tay-
lor illusion [58]; kinesthesic visual motion [59
&
]),
tactile inputs (e.g., bistable perception [52
&
]), and
motor inputs (e.g., biological motion [60–62]). An
open question is also whether certain signals
impacting BSC, play a particular role in shaping
visual consciousness.
Taken together, the reviewed data suggest that
the quality of visual perception is not a simple
function of retinal input, but also the product of
integration with other sensory signals, including
bodily signals. This bidirectional interaction in
which bodily and visual information modulate
one another indicate that to comprehensively
understand visual consciousness, or BSC, or both,
they must be studied together, including their
influence on self-consciousness.OPEN QUESTIONS
We reviewed clinical and experimental evidence
suggesting a bidirectional relationship between vis-
ual consciousness and BSC. Many questions remainyright © 2015 Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. Unaut
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examples below.Does bodily self-consciousness require
perceptual consciousness?
Is BSC based on the (perceptually) conscious brain or
are unconscious multisensory processes sufficient to
induce BSC? The latter seems likely considering that
vestibular and proprioceptive signals are both pri-
mordial for BSC, while remaining most of the time
outside the stream of perceptual consciousness
under normal conditions. Progress on this issue
would require assessment of whether changes of
self-identification and self-location can be obtained
in cases when multisensory conflicts are not
detected explicitly (i.e., participants feel the visuo-
tactile stimuli but cannot discriminate whether they
are synchronous or asynchronous), or in case the
visuotactile stimuli themselves remain under the
threshold for perceptual consciousness (i.e., due
to psychophysical manipulations or pathological
conditions such as blindsight).Does bodily self-consciousness involve
attention?
Although the necessity and sufficiency of attention
for visual consciousness is subject to a heated debate
[63–65], it has only rarely been explicitly explored
in the field of BSC, with the exception of neurologi-
cal research revealing close links between attention
and altered states of BSC (e.g., somatoparaphrenia).
We recently showed in a visual search paradigm
with self-motion and nonself-motion stimuli that
self-movement ‘pops-out’, suggesting that visual
attention is integrated with efferent information
at early stages of processing [66
&
]. Experiments
manipulating attention and investigating its influ-
ence on BSC (and visual consciousness) would be
important and may range from investigations of
preattentive to explicit top–down aspects.Does bodily self-consciousness influence
cognitive processes beyond perception?
Recently, metacognitive vision, that is the second-
order knowledge about a visual process, or ‘knowing
about seeing’, has received much attention [67]. So
far, studies about metacognition have focused on
unisensory perception, and the role of multisensory
processes in metacognitive processes remains
unknown: is what we feel we know about a bimodal
stimulus substantially better than what we know
about a unimodal stimulus? Although, distinct from
the notion of the minimal sense of self reviewedhorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
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Visual consciousness and bodily self-consciousness Faivre et al.here (BSC), it seems interesting to investigate
whether metacognition relates differentially to
BSC (’knowing about feeling’) vs. more classical
cognitive aspects of the self (such as narrative,
remembered, and conceptual aspects of the self)
(’knowing about knowing’).CONCLUSION
Picturing the interplay between visual conscious-
ness and BSC presents both methodological and
theoretical challenges. We believe that deciphering
the interactions between perception of the environ-
ment, perception of one’s body, and their respective
necessity and sufficiency for visual consciousness
and BSC require an integrated, multisensory study
of consciousness.
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